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Abstract 
We study the consequences of unobserved heterogeneity when employing different econometric 
methods in the estimation of two major value-relevance models: the Price Regression Model (PRM) 
and the Return Regression Model (RRM). Leveraging a large panel data set of European listed 
companies, we first demonstrate that robust Hausman tests and Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier 
tests are of fundamental importance to choose correctly among a fixed-effects model, a random-effects 
model, or a pooled OLS model. Second, we provide evidence that replacing firm fixed-effects with 
country and industry fixed-effects can lead to large differences in the magnitude of the key coefficients, 
with serious consequences for the interpretation of the effect of changes in earnings and book values 
per share on firm value. Finally, we offer recommendations to applied researchers aiming to improve 
the robustness of their econometric strategy. 
Keywords: Value-Relevance; Linear Information Model; IFRS; Price Regression Model; Return 
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1. Introduction 
We investigate whether unobserved heterogeneity can lead to misspecifications in the estimation of 
value-relevance models. This is an important topic in other related fields such as asset pricing and 
corporate finance, as recently documented by Gormley and Matsa (2014). However, the value-relevance 
accounting literature has hitherto only partially investigated this issue.  
Value-relevance studies aim to assess the extent to which accounting data reflect information that 
is “relevant” for firm value as represented by the stock price (Holthausen and Watts, 2001). Over the 
last decades, a substantial amount of accounting studies have focused on the value relevance effects 
around the implementation of International Financial Reporting Standards, henceforth IFRS (Callao et 
al., 2007; Zeff, 2007; Aharony et al., 2010; Devalle et al., 2010; Horton and Serafeim, 2010; Barth et 
al., 2012; Tsalavoutas et al., 2012; Barth et al., 2014; Christensen et al., 2015).  
The motivation of our study lies in the heterogeneity of the approaches employed in the empirical 
literature, which hinders the comparability of findings for different countries (ICAEW, 2014). To 
address this issue and to answer calls for more robust econometric analysis in accounting research 
(Brüggemann et al, 2013), we investigate the impact of using different approaches on the magnitude 
and statistical significance of the coefficients of regression models typically employed in value 
relevance studies.  
The validity of the coefficient estimates of value-relevance models is a key topic in the value-
relevance literature (Kothari and Zimmerman, 1995; Barth and Kallapur, 1996; Aboody et al., 2002). 
However, the existing literature does not provide clear guidelines to applied researchers on how to 
choose among different types of econometric approaches. It is also unclear whether choosing an 
inappropriate model may lead to wrong inferences with respect to whether a certain accounting variable 
is value relevant or not. This is the focus of our study. 
Our contribution to the literature is threefold. First, we demonstrate the importance of employing 
the Hausman test (in its robust version, as developed by Arellano, 1993, and Wooldridge, 2002, and 
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2010) to decide whether a Fixed Effects (FE) model or a Random Effects (RE) model should be used. 
While some papers have used the Hausman test to select the correct model between FE and RE model 
(for example, Worthington and West, 2004), they tend not to use the “robust” Hausman test, and in 
most cases (for example, Devalle et al., 2010) neither version of the Hausman test is employed. For 
cases where the RE model is valid, we point out that the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test 
should be run to choose between the OLS model and the RE model. Using these tests is important to 
ensure that the estimator chosen is consistent and efficient. In particular, choosing the FE model when 
the RE model should be preferred may lead to insignificant coefficients, because the RE model is more 
efficient than the FE model. This is a crucial issue for researchers interested in value relevance analysis 
because an insignificant coefficient indicates that a variable is not value relevant.   
Second, we investigate the differential impact of firm FE, year FE, country FE, and industry FE. A 
recent study by Amir et al. (2016) points out that many empirical accounting researchers tend to 
(incorrectly) replace firm FE with other forms of FE, in particular industry FE. Amir et al. (2016) 
address this issue only for U.S. listed firms (which prepare their financial statements according to the 
U.S. GAAP), and they do not focus on value relevance models. We extend their findings in three ways: 
i) we examine value relevance models; ii) we use data for European listed firms for the period of 
compulsory IFRS adoption (2005 onwards); and iii) we examine the impact of the length of the sample 
period on the bias resulting from neglecting firm FE using Monte Carlo simulations.  
Third, we examine whether using different levels of clustering the standard errors leads to 
substantially different results, and we check for the potential impact of attrition. We provide evidence 
that clustering the standard errors matters, and we emphasise the impact of using a small number of 
clusters on the extent of the bias. Attrition bias may also affect the coefficient estimates and overall 
explanatory power of the model, and this problem is likely to be more acute for sample periods including 
the 2008-2009 crisis. 
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The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the sample composition and 
data. Section 3 examines the impact of model specification on a sample of European listed firms. 
Section 4 concludes the paper and offers recommendations for future research. 
2. Sample and data  
For our empirical analysis, we focus on two models widely employed in the value relevance 
literature: the Price Regression Model (PRM) and the Return Regression Model (RRM). These models 
constitute the basis to examine the value relevance of book value of equity and earnings, as well as 
specific items of financial statements, such as research and development expenditure (Aboody and Lev, 
1998; Kallapur and Kwan, 2004).1 
The PRM involves estimating a regression of stock price (P) on book value (BVPS) and earnings 
(EPS) per share (Barth et al., 2008):2 
Pit = a + bBVPSit + cEPSit + eit       (Eq. 1) 
where i = 1, 2, …, N represent firms, t = 1, 2, …, T represent years.  
The RRM is based on a regression of stock returns on earnings per share and changes in earnings 
per share: 
itititititit ePEPScPbEPSaRET   11 //      (Eq. 2) 
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RET and ΔEPSit = EPSit – EPSit–1 (Barth and Clinch, 2009).  
                                                          
1 These models have also been the focus of similar papers that have examined methodological issues in value 
relevance models, such as Barth and Clinch (2009), who evaluate the possibility of omitted variables bias in the 
PRM and RRM, and the importance of scale effects. 
2 We focus on this model, which is based on per-share values, because it is less likely to be prone to scale effects 
than models based on the market value of equity, book value of equity, and earnings. Some studies also use market 
value of equity, book value of equity, and earnings, rather than the per share figures, and in certain cases the 
variables are adjusted for scale effects through a common deflator. For an explanation of the consequences of 
using different specifications and deflators, see Barth and Clinch (2009). 
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Where P is the stock price as at six months after fiscal year-end (Lang et al., 2006; Barth et al., 
2008) and DPS denotes dividends per share. For simplicity, in the discussion below we use the notation 
DEPS = (EPSit /Pit–1) and ΔDEPS  = (ΔEPSit /Pit–1). All variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th 
percentile to reduce the potential impact of outliers. 
We collect accounting data for sample of European listed companies from Amadeus for 71 
industries,3 selected on the basis of the first two digits of the U.S. SIC code,4 and 17 European countries. 
Price data are collected from Datastream. We choose to examine European listed firms because the 
majority of the recent value-relevance studies have focused on Europe, especially to assess the impact 
of IFRS reporting on value relevance (Devalle et al., 2010; Barth et al., 2014). The cross-country nature 
of our sample enables us test the robustness of our analysis across different institutional, regulatory and 
cultural settings (McLeay and Jafaar, 2007; Christensen et al., 2013a, 2013b; Veith and Werner, 2014).  
We choose 2005 as the beginning of our sample period because prior to 2005 even listed firms 
could use domestic GAAP and this may produce some noise in the data. We choose 2013 as final year 
because most of the papers on IFRS focus on sample periods shorter than ten years.  
Our initial sample consists of 5,164 companies. To eliminate inconsistencies due to different 
reporting dates, we consider only firms with fiscal year-end as of December 31st. This selection criterion 
results in 1,208 companies leaving the sample. We also exclude companies with a negative book value 
(15 companies). Data availability for our main variables of interest, P, BVPS, and EPS, during the 
sample period 2005-2013 results in 2,860 companies selected. For the RRM, for which we need data 
also on DPS and the first lag of P, we have 2,459 companies. In Appendix A we report the composition 
of our sample and the mean of each variables. 
                                                          
3 The initial number of industries in the sample is 73. For two of these industries, data availability for the variables 
employed in the regressions results in zero observations in the regressions. Therefore, effectively we have 71 
industry clusters. 
4 The two-digit SIC code is commonly employed in accounting research to identify industry clusters (see, among 
others, Shalev et al., 2013). 
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As shown in Figure 1, the sample is unbalanced, with firms exiting and entering the sample over 
time, causing drastic changes in market capitalization and sample size. The most dramatic change seems 
to be in conjunction with the financial crisis (2008-2009). We therefore have an unbalanced panel data 
set, and attrition bias (Hausman and Wise, 1979) may be present. We address this issue in sections 3.3 
and 3.4. 
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
3. Empirical examination of model specification 
3.1. Choosing among OLS, RE models and FE models 
We start our empirical examination by offering evidence on the importance of two tests: the 
Hausman test, which is employed to choose between the FE and the RE model; and the Breusch-Pagan 
LM test, which indicates whether a researcher should use the RE model or the OLS model.  
We argue that selecting the wrong econometric model is a serious problem because it can lead to 
wrong inferences. For example, choosing the RE model when the FE model should be preferred 
(because the Hausman test is significant) may lead to wrong coefficient estimates. This bias may 
significantly affect the magnitude (and, potentially, sign) of the coefficients for the PRM or RRM 
model. On the other hand, if the Hausman test is insignificant the RE model should be chosen, and using 
the FE model may result in statistically insignificant coefficients even when they would be statistically 
significant for the RE model. Similarly, if the Breusch-Pagan LM test is significant, the RE model 
should be preferred. However, if the Breusch-Pagan LM test is insignificant, the pooled OLS model 
will be more efficient than the RE model. 
In Table 1 we report the results of estimating the PRM and RRM on the whole sample, and we 
employ the “robust” Hausman test (Arellano, 1993, and Wooldridge, 2002, and 2010) and the Breusch-
Pagan LM test to understand which model should be employed. Table 1 shows that using the RE model 
for the PRM leads to inconsistent coefficient estimates, because the Hausman p-value is 0.000 (see table 
in Table 1, Panel A). This is consistent with the large difference in the coefficients for the RE and FE 
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models, suggesting that the RE model leads to inconsistent estimates. Conversely, using the FE model 
for the RRM leads to an insignificant coefficient for ΔDEPS (see table in Table 1, Panel B), while using 
the RE model results in significant coefficients for both ΔDEPS and DEPS. This is consistent with the 
higher efficiency for the RE estimator relative to the FE estimator. Note that, as evidenced by the 
Hausman p-value (0.197), the RE model should be preferred to the FE model. The Breusch-Pagan LM 
test results for Panel B suggest that the RE model should be preferred to the OLS model, because the 
P-value is less than 0.05.  
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
In Table 2 we provide the results of robust Hausman tests and Breusch-Pagan LM tests for country-
based sub-samples. In Table 2 we denote the robust version of the Hausman test AW, the Breusch-
Pagan LM test BP.5 This table is connected with Tables 3 and 4 (reported below), and in particular 
specification (3), which includes firm FE, and specification (1), which considers a pooled OLS without 
any FE.  
The results reported in Table 2 show that in 13 out of 17 cases for the PRM we reject the null 
hypothesis that the RE model is consistent, and we find evidence that the FE model is the most suitable 
method for the estimation of the PRM. For certain countries (for example, Portugal), lack of significance 
for the Hausman test may be due to the small number of observations, which may reduce the power of 
the test (Clark and Linzer, 2015). Conversely, the model with firm FE does not perform very well for 
the RRM: only for 9 out of 17 countries is the model with firm FE preferred to the RE model. The RE 
model is preferred for countries with a large number of observations (such as France), and even for the 
whole sample considering all 17 countries. This finding suggests that, in this case, the number of 
observations is unlikely to be the main cause for lack of significance of the Hausman test. Further, the 
results for the Breusch-Pagan LM test suggest that in six out of the nine cases (the eight cases for the 
individual countries and the case for the whole sample) the pooled OLS should be the preferred model 
                                                          
5 Using the original version of the Hausman test also results in similar rejection rates. However, the results for the 
two tests is inconsistent for certain countries. Therefore, choosing the robust version of the Hausman test is 
important. 
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(in other words, the FE model and the RE model do not perform better than the pooled OLS model). 
Some of these cases refer to countries with a small number of observations (for example, Luxembourg 
or Ireland). 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
3.2. Results for country-based sub-samples: coefficient estimates and statistical significance 
In Tables 3 and 4 we report the results (coefficient estimates and statistical significance level) for 
six different specifications for the PRM and the RRM, respectively, for 17 regressions (one for each 
country in the sample):6  
i) Pooled OLS with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered on the firm level (model 1); 
ii) Pooled OLS with year FE, and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered on the firm level 
(model 2); 
iii) FE model (where the panel unit is the firm), with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered 
on the firm level (model 3); 
iv) FE model (where the panel unit is the firm) with year FE, and with heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors, clustered on the firm level (model 4); 
v) Pooled OLS with industry FE, and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered on the firm 
level (model 5); 
vi) Pooled OLS with industry and year FE, and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered on 
the firm level (model 6).7 
                                                          
6 We decide to cluster the standard errors on the firm level because the number of industries is less than 20 for six 
countries, and papers such as Cameron and Miller (2015), Carter et al. (2013), Kezdi (2004), and Wooldridge 
(2003) warn against clustering the standard errors when the number of clusters is small. In particular, Carter et al. 
(2013) suggest that even when the actual number of clusters is above 20 the “effective” number of clusters can be 
smaller once cluster heterogeneity is allowed for. This is likely to be the case in our sample, because the number 
of observations for each cluster is not fixed (that is, we have unbalanced clusters). For Luxembourg we have a 
number of firms smaller than 20: this suggests the results for Luxembourg should be read with caution because 
the standard errors may be biased. For this reason, we run the six regressions for Luxembourg even without 
clustering. The results for the regressions without clustering (untabulated but available upon request) suggest that 
clustering in this case generates smaller standard errors. 
7 None of the firms in the sample changes industry or country of origin during the sample period. For this reason, 
we cannot include both firm FE and industry FE or (in the analysis for the whole sample) both firm FE and country 
FE. We resort to testing the impact of industry FE and country FE in regressions without firm FE. 
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The results suggest that the type of specification chosen bears a strong impact on the magnitude and 
statistical significance of the coefficients of the variables, and, in some cases, even the sign of the 
coefficient changes. For instance, in Table 3 (PRM), we find that for several countries (Denmark, 
Finland, Luxembourg and Norway), when we introduce both firm FE and year FE the sign coefficient 
of BVPS changes from positive (pooled OLS case) to negative. For some countries (e.g. Germany), the 
introduction of firm FE and year FE causes a dramatic reduction in the size and statistical significance 
of the coefficient on BVPS (from 1.183, significant at the 1% level) to 0.108 (insignificant).  
Wilcoxon and two-sample t-tests (reported at the bottom of Table 3) suggest that adding firm FE, 
country FE, or industry FE leads to significantly different coefficients for EPS, but not for BVPS. 
Adding only year FE does not lead to significantly different coefficients in comparison with the pooled 
OLS model. The coefficient on BVPS is significant at the 5% level only in eight cases out of 17 for 
specifications (1), (2), and (3), in nine cases for specification (4) and in ten cases for specifications (5) 
and (6).  
The coefficient on EPS is significant in seven cases of out 17 for specification (5), in eight cases 
for specification (6), and in nine cases for specifications (1) – (4). In other words, the specification 
chosen affects inferences on whether BVPS or EPS bear an impact on stock price.  
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
Consistent with the results reported in Table 3, Table 4 highlights that there are substantial changes 
for the slope coefficients and related statistical significance of both of the variables of the RRM when 
firm FE or industry FE are included. The average coefficient on DEPS tends to increase as a result of 
the inclusion of firm FE from 0.85 to 1.83 (this difference is significant, according to both Wilcoxon 
tests and two-sample t-tests), while the coefficients on ΔDEPS tend to decrease (the mean drops from 
0.34 to -0.36, and the Wilcoxon and two-sample t-tests are significant at the 1% level). The coefficient 
for ΔDEPS in the models with firm FE (and even in the model with both industry and year FE) is 
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negative, which is counterintuitive (a positive change in earnings decreases stock returns).8 This result 
is not due to an outlier that is pushing the average coefficient for ΔDEPS below zero (as said above, we 
winsorise all variables).9  
When industry FE (but not year FE) are in the regressions, the results are similar to those for the 
model without year FE, firm FE or industry FE (pooled OLS), and also to those of the specification 
with only year FE. However, when both industry FE and year FE are considered, the results are similar 
to those with both firm FE and year FE. As for the statistical significance of the models, the results for 
the coefficients on DEPS are significant in 11 cases out of 17 for specifications (1), (3), and (4), in nine 
cases for specification (2), and in eight cases for specifications (5) and (6). For ΔDEPS, there are only 
six significant cases for specifications (1) and (2), and including firm FE reduces further the number of 
significant coefficients (four when only firm FE are included, in model (3), and two if both firm and 
year FE are included, in model (4)). For models (5) and (6) there are three and five significant 
coefficients, respectively.  
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
In Tables 3 and 4 we have clustered the standard errors on the firm level. Because of the importance 
of clustering the standard errors (Petersen, 2009), we now briefly examine the impact of running the 
same regressions without clustering. These results are untabulated but available from the authors upon 
request. As reported above, for Luxembourg the number of firm-clusters is relatively small and this 
may have led to biased standard errors (Cameron and Miller, 2015). However, when we estimate the 
regressions without clustering on the firm level, the results in terms of statistical significance of the 
coefficients on BVPS and EPS remain unaltered relative to those reported in Table 3. The results related 
to Table 4, instead, change in a number of cases. The number of significant coefficients on DEPS 
                                                          
8 The high proportion of negative coefficients for ΔDEPS decreases substantially when we employ Earnings 
Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT), instead of earnings. This suggests that the transitory earnings issue (Ota, 2003) 
may be causing such counterintuitive results. 
9 For the specification with only year FE, the coefficient on ΔDEPS is positive in 15 cases out of 17, while in the 
model with firm FE (and that with both firm and year FE), the coefficient is positive in only four cases out of 17, 
and in the remaining 13 cases it becomes negative. 
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increases when there is no clustering for all six specifications,10 suggesting that neglecting within-firm 
correlation may lead to upward biased standard errors. However, this is not the case for the coefficients 
on ΔDEPS, for which the number of significant coefficients decreases, increases, or remains the same.11 
We now examine briefly the results reported in Tables 3 and 4 in conjunction with the results 
reported in Table 2. For the sake of brevity, we focus on several cases that stand out. For example, for 
Italy the results for the PRM coefficients are significant only when firm FE are included (specifications 
(3) and (4) in Table 3). The results in Table 2 for the robust version of the Hausman test confirm that 
firm FE matter: the p-value for Italy for the PRM is 0.006. Similarly, the results in Table 4 for Austria 
suggest that the coefficient on ΔDEPS is positive and significant when firm FE are not included 
(columns (1) and (2) of Table 4) and negative and insignificant when firm FE are included. The p-value 
for the robust version of the Hausman test is 0.002, confirming that including firm FE has a significant 
impact on the coefficient estimates, and the RE and OLS coefficient estimates are therefore inconsistent.  
3.3 The role of different types of fixed effects and attrition 
In Table 5, we report the results of OLS regressions for the PRM and RRM where year FE, country 
FE, and industry FE are included, while firm FE are excluded. We also report F-tests to show the 
incremental explanatory power of each type of FE. This is useful to examine whether a type of FE is 
redundant once the other types of FE are included. All types of FE are important, as the F-tests are 
significant at either the 1% or 5% level. This finding suggests that time-varying (but panel-invariant) 
variables captured by year effects, industry time-invariant variables, and country time-invariant 
variables are, at least to some extent, independent of each other. 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
                                                          
10 The number of significant coefficients on DEPS increases when clustering is not performed, as follows: from 
11 to 13 for specification (1), from nine to 13 for specification (2), from 11 to 12 for specifications (3) and (4), 
from eight to 12 for specification (5) and from eight to ten for specification (6). 
11 The number of significant coefficients on ΔDEPS increases when clustering is not performed for specifications 
(4) and (5), remains the same for specifications (1) and (2), and decreases for specifications (3) and (6).  
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In Tables 6 and 7 we dig deeper into the impact of unobserved heterogeneity by comparing the 
results for a pooled OLS model with those of models that allow for a variety of FE: i) pooled OLS; ii) 
year FE; iii) firm FE; iv) both firm and year FE; v) industry FE; vi) industry and year FE; and vii) 
country and year FE.12  
Finally, to examine the potential impact of attrition, we also run the regressions with firm and year 
FE with a balanced panel of 528 firms that are in our sample throughout the period from 2005 to 2013 
(model (8)). The remaining firms come from 15 countries (we lose Luxembourg and Denmark) and 56 
industries. 
Consistent with the results reported above for the 17 country sub-samples (Table 3), the results 
reported in Table 6 demonstrate that adding firm FE reduces the coefficient on EPS (from around 4.5 
to around 1.8) in the PRM. The coefficient on BVPS in the PRM also decreases (from around 0.76 to 
around 0.34). Industry FE, country FE and year FE bear a negligible effect on either coefficient. 
According to Amir et al. (2016), as the number of industries increases, the importance of industry FE 
should increase. However, despite the fact that we have 71 industry clusters but only 17 country clusters, 
industry FE are not more important than country FE. This finding suggests that heterogeneity at the 
industry level for European studies is not very strong. Only firm FE result in a substantial decrease in 
the coefficients on both BVPS and EPS, which remain statistically significant for all specifications. Firm 
FE also result in a substantial decrease in R-squared values. In specification (8), where we use a 
balanced panel of 528 firms for a model with both firm FE and year FE, the explanatory power of the 
model increases relative to the corresponding specification with an unbalanced panel: the R-squared 
increases from 21.2% to 37%.13 This finding indicates that the association between market and book 
                                                          
12 In untabulated results, we also look at the impact of country-level institutional factors such as: Rule of law, 
which captures the degree to which agents trust the rules of society, as well as quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, police, and the courts (source: Worldwide Governance Indicators Database, 
www.govindicators.org); Absence, which proxies for the extent to which a topic is covered only by IAS/IFRS but 
not by domestic accounting standards and Divergence, which measures the extent to which rules for the same item 
differ between domestic accounting standards and IAS/IFRS (Nobes, 2001); Control of Corruption, which 
represents the extent to which public power is perceived to be used for private gain (source: Worldwide 
Governance Indicators Database, www.govindicators.org); and Legal Origin, which proxies for the legal origin 
of the company law or commercial code of each country as defined in La Porta et al. (1998). The results are very 
similar to those reported in Tables 6 and 7.  
13 This is the “within” R-squared, based on the variation within firm clusters. 
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values for new firms and firms that eventually become delisted is weaker than for other firms, which in 
turn may indicate attrition bias, which is particularly harmful for FE models (Verbeek, 1990).  
[Insert Table 6 Here]  
The results in Table 7 confirm the results reported in Table 4 with respect to the impact of firm FE 
on the coefficients of both DEPS and ΔDEPS: firm FE result in an increase of the coefficient on DEPS 
and a decrease in the coefficient on ΔDEPS. Unlike in the sub-sample estimations, the coefficient on 
ΔDEPS does not become negative. Industry and country FE do not bear a significant impact on the 
coefficient estimates of either variable. The coefficients on DEPS are significant for all specifications 
but those on ΔDEPS are insignificant when firm FE are included. The inclusion of year FE is associated 
with a strong increase in R-squared values. This finding suggests that the RRM model is highly sensitive 
to macroeconomic changes that affect all firms in a certain year. Finally, the results for the FE model 
with year FE when we use a balanced panel of 528 firms suggest that the R-squared improves relative 
to that of the same regression on an unbalanced panel (from 33.7% to 41.1%). This finding is consistent 
with the results reported for the PRM in Table 6. The magnitude of the coefficient on DEPS increases. 
The coefficient on ΔDEPS remains insignificant, similar to what reported for the unbalanced panel.14  
[Insert Table 7 Here]  
3.4 Monte Carlo simulations 
The results of our empirical analysis show that replacing firm FE with other types of FE may be 
inappropriate, consistent with the findings by Amir et al. (2016), based on Monte Carlo simulations. 
Amir et al. (2016), however, focus on a fixed number of periods (10). In this section, we examine the 
impact of the length of the sample period and attrition on the bias resulting from neglecting firm FE. In 
particular, we provide an examination of the impact of omitting firm FE when year, country, and 
industry FE are included on the bias of the coefficients. We also compare the size of the standard errors 
                                                          
14 In untabulated results, we have run regressions that exclude countries for which the RE model is preferred to 
the FE model as reported in Tables 3 and 4. The results are substantially the same as those reported in Tables 6 
and 7. 
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of the coefficients across specifications, to evaluate the relative efficiency of the OLS, RE and FE 
model.  
Our Monte Carlo simulations are calibrated according to the parameter values estimated in the 
previous section and reported in Table 5. For the sake of brevity, we focus our discussion on the PRM, 
but our results extend to the RRM as well.  
The specifications considered are as follows: i) pooled OLS; ii) OLS with year FE; iii) OLS with 
year and country FE; iv) OLS with year and industry FE; v) RE model with year FE; and vi) FE model 
(that is, model with firm FE) with year FE. 
We run 500 replications using simulated data for a sample of firms with the same composition (in 
terms of country and industry of origin of the firms) as that used for the empirical analysis above. This 
is done by replacing the data for P, BVPS and EPS for each firm in the dataset with simulated data. For 
the simulations, we keep in our dataset only firms for which we have information about the country and 
SIC code. The number of firms is therefore 2,842, as in Table 6, (models (5) and (6)). To understand 
how the length of the sample period affects the bias in the coefficients and standard errors, we run the 
replications considering 10 periods for Panel A and 5 periods for Panel B (that is, T =  10 in the first 
case, and T = 5 in the second case).  Moreover, to examine the effect of attrition bias, Panel C considers 
a maximum number of periods equal to 10 (Max(T) = 10), but with attrition bias leading to an average 
time span equal to 9 periods (T-bar = 9).15 More details on the Data Generating Process (DGP) are 
presented in the notes below Table 8. 
In both cases (T = 10, and T = 5), the models with the firm and year FE provide the smallest bias 
in both the coefficients and standard errors of the coefficients. The results show that the average 
coefficient bias increases as T decreases when firm FE are not included. For Panel C, we find that the 
bias is slightly bigger than for T = 10, but smaller than for T = 5, consistent with the fact that T-bar = 
9. The bias is larger for OLS models, and slightly smaller for the RE model. However, in both cases the 
                                                          
15 As explained in the notes to Table 8, we allow 20% of the firms to exit the sample from the sixth period 
onwards (50% of the sample period). This results in a loss of (20% * 50%) = 10% of the observations. 
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bias is substantial. Even the bias for the standard errors is smallest for the FE model with year FE. These 
findings suggest that the impact of neglecting firm FE becomes bigger as T decreases, and attrition bias 
exacerbates this problem. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
4. Conclusions and implications for future research 
In this study, we have investigated whether unobserved heterogeneity is important in value-
relevance research as it is in other areas of the economics and finance literature.  
We have used a large panel of European listed firms to investigate the impact of firm FE, industry 
FE, and country FE on the coefficient estimates and corresponding t-statistics and p-values. While most 
empirical studies on value relevance focus their discussion on the estimated t-statistics and p-values, 
wrong coefficient estimates can seriously impair the validity of the economic interpretation of valuation 
models. For example, in the PRM, the coefficient on EPS represents the change in stock price following 
a change by one unit in EPS. Therefore, a biased regression coefficient can lead researchers to over- or 
under-estimate the importance of changes in EPS when assessing the value of a company. This problem 
is also likely to undermine the reliability of empirical studies evaluating the effects of the changes in 
accounting regulation on capital markets, leading to important implications for policy making. A 
positive and statistically significant coefficient is not enough to evaluate the impact of a regulation, 
because policy makers are often interested in the change in the magnitude of the coefficient. For 
example, an increase in the coefficient on EPS in the post-IFRS period may be interpreted as an 
indication of stronger value relevance of EPS (Devalle et al., 2010). 
In this paper, we have offered several important contributions. First, we have uncovered important 
cross-country heterogeneities in the importance of firm FE for both the PRM and RRM when these 
models are employed separately for each of the country-based sub-samples. Industry FE, on the other 
hand, do not appear to bear a substantial impact on inferences, despite the fact that the number of 
industry dummies in our sample is rather large (71). In particular, we show that neglecting firm FE in 
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the estimation of the PRM and RRM may lead to a substantial bias in both the size of the coefficients 
and the corresponding t-statistics of the variables of the PRM and RRM. Using Monte Carlo 
simulations, we have shown that the bias increases as the sample period becomes shorter, or in the 
presence of attrition bias.  
Second, our results have demonstrated that both industry FE and country FE bear a negligible effect 
on the magnitude and statistical significance of the coefficients. For this reason, allowing for industry 
FE and country FE may not be enough to correctly estimate the impact of the variables in the PRM and 
RRM for studies based on European listed firms. 
Finally, we examine the impact of clustering the standard errors and attrition and we find that both 
of them can lead to wrong inferences. Clustering the standard errors should allow for the impact of a 
small number of cluster on the bias of the standard error estimates. Attrition is particularly important 
for studies that consider the period of the financial crisis, because of the large number of firms that exit 
the sample during this period. 
To decide whether to add or not firm FE in the estimation of the PRM and RRM in a European 
setting, we suggest that researchers employ “robust” Hausman tests, because the choice between RE 
and FE models is sample-dependent and thus which model should be preferred cannot be determined a 
priori.  If the RE model is preferred, researchers should also test whether the pooled OLS model may 
be appropriate using the Breusch-Pagan LM test. Further, we suggest that year FE be included in the 
regression, unless the researcher is interested in the effect of time-varying macroeconomic components 
whose coefficients would be unidentified in the presence of year FE. Robustness tests considering the 
impact of industry and country FE and clustering the standard errors on different levels (including two-
level clustering) may also be useful. 
To support researchers interested in value relevance studies in Europe, we also provide a “toolbox" 
in Table 9, which summarises the main implications of our findings.  
[Insert Table 9 Here]  
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Clearly, we have not assessed the influence of different estimation techniques on the PRM and 
RRM under all conceivable conditions. However, our findings support researchers interested in 
evaluating the impact of regulation on value relevance by offering guidance on how different 
econometric models may impinge on the estimation of the PRM and RRM.  
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Table 1: Impact of using incorrectly the FE model or the RE model. 
 Panel A  Panel B  
 PRM PRM RRM RRM 
All countries RE model FE model RE model FE model 
     
BVPS 0.635*** 0.340***   
 (0.086) (0.107)   
EPS 2.290*** 1.858***   
 (0.367) (0.331)   
DEPS   0.395*** 0.723** 
   (0.124) (0.322) 
ΔDEPS   0.209*** 0.076 
   (0.042) (0.110) 
Constant 13.064*** 24.978*** 0.037*** 0.008 
 (1.905) (2.957) (0.012) (0.031) 
Hausman AW 0.000  0.197  
Breusch-Pagan LM   0.000  
Clustering Firm Firm Firm Firm 
Observations 15,656 15,656 11,424 11,424 
Number of firms 2,860 2,860 2,459 2,459 
R-squared (overall) 0.7617 0.7645 0.0320 0.0283 
Notes: The two specifications employed are as follows: 
Panel A: PRM: Pit = a + bBVPSit + cEPSit + eit   
Where Pit is stock price, as at six months after fiscal year-end (Lang et al., 2006; Barth et al., 2008). BVPSit and EPSit are the book value 
per share, and the earnings per share, respectively. All variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
Panel B: RRM: 
itititititit ePEPScPbEPSaRET   11 //
 
where 
1
1


it
ititit
it
P
PDPSP
RET and ΔEPSit = EPSit – EPSit–1 (Barth and Clinch, 2009).  
Hausman AW refers to the refinement of Hausman’s test by Arellano (1993) and Wooldridge (2002, 2010) method, which allows for 
errors that are not Independent and Identically Distributed (IID). Breusch-Pagan LM denotes Breusch-Pagan LM test for the choics of either 
RE model or Pooled OLS.   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 2: Results for the robust Hausman and Breusch-Pagan LM tests for PRM and RRM for 17 European countries. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 PRM PRM RRM RRM 
 AW BP AW BP 
Country p-value p-value p-value p-value 
Austria 0.000  0.002  
Belgium 0.063 0.000 0.009  
Denmark 0.000  0.001  
Finland 0.000  0.005  
France 0.000  0.552 0.000 
Germany 0.000  0.016  
Greece 0.329 0.000 0.000  
Ireland 0.000  a) 1.000 
Italy 0.006  0.000  
Lux.burg 0.048  0.127 0.403 
Neth.nds 0.419 0.000 0.707 0.325 
Norway 0.000  a) 1.000 
Portugal 0.164 0.000 0.652 0.224 
Spain 0.005  0.030  
Sweden 0.000  0.164 0.015 
Switz.nd 0.000  a) 1.000 
UK 0.001  0.000  
ALL 0.000  0.197 0.000 
Notes: This table presents the p-values for robust Hausman tests and Breusch-Pagan tests to choose between FE models, RE models, and OLS models. PRM stands for Price Regression Model and RRM stands for 
Return Regression Model. For more information on these models, see notes to Table 1 and equations (1) and (2). AW refers to the refinement of Hausman’s test by Arellano (1993) and Wooldridge (2002, 2010) method, 
which allows for errors that are not Independent and Identically Distributed (IID). BP denotes Breusch-Pagan LM test for choosing between the RE model and a Pooled OLS.  a) The estimates for the RE model are 
degenerate, because the value for theta suggests that the pooled OLS model is to be preferred. Rejection of the null hypothesis for AW (p-value < 0.05 for a 5% significance level) suggests that the FE model should be 
preferred to the RE model. Rejection of the null hypothesis for BP (p-value < 0.05 for a 5% significance level) suggests that the RE model should be preferred to the pooled model. 
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Table 3: Results for the PRM regressions for 17 European countries: estimated coefficients for BVPS and EPS. 
  
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
Country BVPS EPS BVPS EPS BVPS EPS BVPS EPS BVPS EPS BVPS EPS 
Austria 0.959*** 3.432 0.921*** 3.839 2.376*** 1.941 2.363*** 1.887 0.952*** 3.579 0.916*** 3.973 
Belgium 0.824*** 3.722** 0.822*** 3.761** 0.978* 1.086 0.978* 1.141 0.899*** 2.978** 0.887*** 3.082** 
Denmark 0.602 6.178 0.608 6.097 -0.142 3.411*** -0.159 3.087*** 0.794* 4.128 0.817* 3.846 
Finland 0.459 5.604** 0.467 5.538** -0.530*** 5.412*** -0.496** 5.190*** 0.514 5.204** 0.539 5.013** 
France 0.622*** 5.687*** 0.622*** 5.677*** 0.223 1.525*** 0.225 1.463*** 0.626*** 5.449*** 0.627*** 5.437*** 
Germany 1.183*** -0.806 1.187*** -0.830 0.119 0.872 0.108 0.842 1.099*** -0.746 1.106*** -0.783 
Greece 0.431*** 4.841*** 0.446*** 4.751*** 0.452*** 5.947*** 0.479*** 5.765*** 0.388*** 3.413* 0.408*** 3.296* 
Ireland 0.945 11.591*** 0.812 12.287*** 3.911*** -0.033 3.634*** 0.769 1.771** 5.610* 1.519** 6.508** 
Italy 0.142 2.260 0.153 2.088 1.079*** 1.764*** 1.106*** 1.543** 0.225 1.577 0.235 1.369 
Lux.burg 0.007 0.675 -0.011 0.981* 0.003 -0.021 -0.038** 0.316*** 0.021 -1.972 -0.041 -0.401 
Neth.nds 1.024*** 2.109 1.037*** 2.026 1.085*** 2.462 1.164*** 2.257 0.807*** 2.223 0.824*** 2.112 
Norway 0.872*** 2.658* 0.882*** 2.570* -0.165 1.252** -0.091 1.131* 0.834*** 1.261 0.846*** 1.168 
Portugal 0.095 3.774** 0.109 3.721** 1.125 2.062 1.222 1.746 0.255 3.772** 0.247 3.722** 
Spain 0.696* -0.004 0.705* -0.033 0.167* 4.521*** 0.162* 4.600*** 0.305* 0.267 0.308* 0.254 
Sweden 0.252 7.161*** 0.252 7.165*** 0.610*** 4.210*** 0.617*** 4.168*** 0.287* 6.727*** 0.287* 6.724*** 
Switz.nd 0.391*** 9.081*** 0.385*** 9.122*** 0.580*** 2.814*** 0.516*** 2.855*** 0.459*** 8.570*** 0.455*** 8.605*** 
UK 0.304 2.748*** 0.287 2.835*** 0.446* 0.635 0.419* 0.737* 0.620*** 2.203*** 0.602*** 2.282*** 
Wilcoxon   0.8313 0.7946 0.7226 0.0277** 0.5862 0.0245** 0.2868 0.0036*** 0.2868 0.0049*** 
Two-sample  
t-test 
  0.4416 0.3436 0.5602 0.0483** 0.5595 0.0384** 0.3268 0.0185** 0.3759 0.0160** 
 
Notes: This table presents the coefficients for the variables of the PRM using a variety of specifications with different types of fixed effects (FE). PRM stands for Price Regression Model. For more information on 
this model, see notes to Table 1 and equation (1). The six specifications employed are as follows: (1) Pooled OLS, (2) Pooled OLS with year fixed-effects, (3) FE regression (firm fixed-effects), (4) FE regression with 
year fixed-effects, (5) OLS with industry fixed-effects, (6) OLS with both industry and year fixed effects. For all specifications, standard errors are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the firm level. Wilcoxon 
denotes the p-value for a Wilcoxon signed-rank test (Wilcoxon, 1945) on the distributions of the coefficients for BVPS and EPS for specification (1) as compared to specifications (2) – (6). The null hypothesis is that 
both distributions are the same. Two- sample t-test reports the p-value for a test for equality of means of the distribution of the coefficient for specification (1) as compared to specifications (2) – (6). 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 4: Results for the RRM regressions for 17 European countries: estimated coefficients for DEPS and ΔDEPS. 
  
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
Country DEPS ΔDEPS DEPS ΔDEPS DEPS ΔDEPS DEPS ΔDEPS DEPS ΔDEPS DEPS ΔDEPS 
Austria 1.247** 2.536*** 1.170** 2.008*** 6.009*** -1.306 4.346** -0.598 1.471 1.914* 0.986 1.519 
Belgium 0.560** 0.199 0.515** 0.099 1.218*** -0.341 1.224*** -0.429 0.578** 0.164 0.569** 0.027 
Denmark 1.261 0.336 1.054 0.264 1.703 -0.660 1.713 -0.717 1.190 0.313 1.024 0.237 
Finland 0.080 0.157 0.132 0.080 0.243 -0.081 0.448* -0.215 0.155 0.061 0.199 -0.010 
France 0.396 0.28*** 0.375* 0.215** 0.357 0.276*** 0.346 0.198*** 0.396 0.270*** 0.376* 0.207** 
Germany 0.471*** 0.294*** 0.426*** 0.285*** 1.192*** -0.090 1.129*** -0.087 0.454** 0.295*** 0.404*** 0.288*** 
Greece 1.693*** 0.904*** 0.945*** 0.931*** 3.231*** 0.119 2.030*** 0.302 1.964*** 0.776** 1.112*** 0.831*** 
Ireland 1.250** -0.042 0.903* 0.195 2.471 -1.236 1.991** -1.015 1.794* -0.557 1.361* -0.311 
Italy 0.730*** 0.421** 0.401** 0.562*** 2.098*** -0.531** 1.194*** -0.070 1.043*** 0.260 0.657*** 0.439*** 
Lux.burg 0.197** 0.011 0.225* -0.029 0.377*** -0.075** 0.347*** -0.048 -1.252 7.257 a) a) 
Neth.nds 0.513 -0.026 0.436 0.032 0.595 0.024 0.586 0.059 0.605 0.038 0.485 0.083 
Norway 0.026 0.546** -0.307 0.630*** 1.535*** -0.299 0.374 0.217 0.340 0.283 -0.085 0.470** 
Portugal 0.842* 0.085 0.731** -0.002 0.409 0.195 1.059* -0.189 0.145 0.253 0.326 0.099 
Spain 0.240** 0.126 0.210* 0.075 0.821*** -0.092 0.687** -0.094 0.263*** 0.123 0.219** 0.081 
Sweden 0.563*** 0.032 0.413** 0.050 1.319** -0.057 1.046** -0.005 0.542** 0.039 0.409** 0.061 
Switz.nd 3.654*** -0.299 2.701*** 0.061 5.627*** -1.626*** 4.001*** -0.969** 3.781*** -0.357 2.790*** 0.022 
UK 0.739*** 0.148 0.739*** 0.142 1.889*** -0.312* 1.772*** -0.306* 0.842*** 0.063 0.842*** 0.055 
Wilcoxon   0.0019*** 0.7583 0.0008*** 0.0010*** 0.0004*** 0.0006*** 0.1359 0.1024 0.0340** 0.0879* 
Two-sample  
t-test 
  0.0090*** 0.8861 0.0033** 0.0071*** 0.0036*** 0.0055*** 0.9369 0.4694 0.0329** 0.1704 
 
Notes: This table presents the coefficients for the variables of the RRM using a variety of specifications with different types of fixed effects (FE). RRM stands for Return Regression Model. For more information 
on this model, see notes to Table 1 and equation (2).  DEPS is earnings per share (EPS) divided by the first lag of stock price and ΔDEPS is the first difference in EPS divided by the first lag of stock price. The six 
specifications employed are as follows: (1) Pooled OLS, (2) Pooled OLS with year fixed-effects, (3) FE regression (firm fixed-effects), (4) FE regression with year fixed-effects, (5) OLS with industry fixed-effects, (6) 
OLS with both industry and year fixed effects. For all specifications, standard errors are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the firm level. a)  For this specification, the number of observations is insufficient to 
estimate the regression parameters. Wilcoxon denotes the p-value for a Wilcoxon signed-rank test (Wilcoxon, 1945) on the distributions of the coefficients for DEPS and DEPS for specification (1) as compared to 
specifications (2) – (6). The null hypothesis is that both distributions are the same. Two- sample t-test reports the p-value for a test for equality of means of the distribution of the coefficient for specification (1) as 
compared to specifications (2) – (6).*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 5: OLS regressions where year FE, country FE, and industry FE are included, while 
firm FE are excluded. 
 
 (1) (2) 
 PRM RRM 
   
BVPS 0.730***  
 (72.249)  
EPS 4.306***  
 (44.220)  
DEPS  0.327*** 
  (14.965) 
ΔDEPS  0.188*** 
  (8.028) 
Year, Country, and Industry FE YES YES 
Firm FE NO NO 
F-test for joint significance of Year FE 10.14*** 626.59*** 
F-test for joint significance of Country FE 41.17*** 4.21*** 
F-test for joint significance of Industry FE 7.13*** 1.39** 
Observations 15,656 11,424 
Firms 2,860 2,459 
R-squared 0.782 0.312 
  Notes: This table presents the results of a cross-country analysis using the PRM and RRM models where year FE, country FE, 
and industry FE are included, while firm FE are excluded. PRM stands for Price Regression Model and RRM stands for Return 
Regression Model. For more information on these models, see notes to Table 1 and equations (1) and (2). In Column (1), PRM is 
estimated while Column (2) reports the estimates for the RRM model Constant included in all specifications but not reported. 
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Table 6: Results for the whole sample using different types of fixed effects: PRM. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
PRM OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS (balanced panel) 
 no FE year FE firm FE firm and year 
FE 
industry FE ind. & year FE Country and year FE firm and year FE 
         
BVPS 0.756*** 0.757*** 0.340*** 0.335*** 0.741*** 0.742*** 0.741*** 0.568*** 
 (7.447) (7.433) (3.161) (3.077) (7.356) (7.342) (7.476) (3.982) 
EPS 4.585*** 4.574*** 1.858*** 1.842*** 4.638*** 4.627*** 4.315*** 2.372*** 
 (4.431) (4.408) (5.614) (5.573) (4.507) (4.483) (4.372) (3.841) 
         
Observations 15,656 15,656 15,656 15,656 15,610 15,610 15,656 4,752 
R-squared 0.765 0.766 0.181 0.212 0.769 0.770 0.774 0.370 
         
Industry FE NO NO NO NO YES YES NO NO 
Year FE NO YES NO YES NO YES YES YES 
Country FE NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO 
Firm FE NO NO YES YES NO NO NO YES 
Number of 
countries 
17 17 17 17 17 17 17 15 
Number of 
industries 
71 71 71 71 71 71 71 56 
Number of 
firms 
2,860 2,860 2,860 2,860 2,842 2,842 2,860 528 
Notes: This table presents the results of a cross-country analysis using the PRM model. PRM stands for Price Regression. For more information on this model, see notes to Table 1 and equation (1). In Column 
(1), PRM is estimated using Pooled OLS. Column (2) estimates the PRM model using Pooled OLS with year effects, Column (3) is estimated PRM model with firm fixed-effects, Column (4) uses FE regression 
with year fixed-effects to estimate PRM model, Column (5) uses OLS with industry fixed-effects for PRM model, Column (6) uses OLS with both industry and year fixed effects and Column (7) uses OLS 
with country and year fixed effects. For all specifications, standard errors are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the firm level. Constant included in all specifications but not reported. 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
Table 7: Results for the whole sample using different types of fixed effects: RRM. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
RRM OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS (balanced panel) 
 no FE year FE firm FE firm and year 
FE 
industry FE ind. & year FE Country and year FE firm and year FE 
         
DEPS 0.354*** 0.315*** 0.723** 0.645** 0.361*** 0.320*** 0.325*** 1.233*** 
 (3.174) (3.239) (2.247) (2.432) (3.103) (3.166) (3.364) (3.026) 
ΔDEPS 0.230*** 0.196*** 0.076 0.051 0.229*** 0.195*** 0.193*** -0.105 
 (5.180) (4.868) (0.692) (0.578) (5.088) (4.798) (4.831) (-0.549) 
         
Observations 11,424 11,424 11,424 11,424 11,401 11,401 11,424 4,224 
R-squared 0.032 0.302 0.040 0.337 0.039 0.308 0.306 0.411 
         
Industry FE NO NO NO NO YES YES NO NO 
Year FE NO YES NO YES NO YES YES YES 
Country FE NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO 
Firm FE NO NO YES YES NO NO NO YES 
Number of 
countries 
17 17 17 17 17 17 17 15 
Number of 
industries 
71 71 71 71 71 71 71 56 
Number of 
firms 
2,459 2,459 2,459 2,459 2,450 2,450 2,459 528 
  Notes: This table presents the results of a cross-country analysis using the RRM model. RRM stands for Return Regression Model. For more information on this model, see notes to Table 1 and equation (2). 
In Column (1), RRM is estimated using Pooled OLS. Column (2) estimates the RRM model using Pooled OLS with year effects, Column (3) is estimated RRM model with firm fixed-effects, Column (4) uses 
FE regression with year fixed-effects to estimate RRM model, Column (5) uses OLS with industry fixed-effects for RRM model, Column (6) uses OLS with both industry and year fixed effects and Column 
(7) uses OLS interacted industry and year fixed effects. For all specifications, standard errors are heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered at the firm level. Constant included in all specifications but not reported. 
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Table 8: Monte Carlo simulations: Impact of sample period length on the bias resulting from neglecting firm FE. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 PRM PRM PRM PRM PRM PRM PRM 
 Variable Coefficient bias Standard 
errors bias 
Coefficient bias Standard 
errors bias 
Coefficient bias Standard 
errors bias 
 
 
Panel A 
T = 10 
Panel B 
T = 5 
Panel C 
Max(T) = 10 
Attrition bias 
T-bar = 9 
OLS without any FE BVPS 0.08293 0.00054 0.13873 0.00101 0.08168 0.00046 
 EPS 0.08258 0.00053 0.13829 0.00080 0.08228 0.00044 
OLS with year FE BVPS 0.08296 0.00054 0.13876 0.00101 0.08171 0.00045 
 EPS 0.08261 0.00053 0.13832 0.00080 0.08229 0.00044 
OLS with year and country FE BVPS 0.08265 0.00054 0.13865 0.00101 0.08149 0.00045 
 EPS 0.08229 0.00053 0.13814 0.00079 0.08207 0.00044 
OLS with year and industry FE BVPS 0.08099 0.00054 0.13705 0.00101 0.07992 0.00045 
 EPS 0.08063 0.00053 0.13659 0.00080 0.08051 0.00044 
RE model with year FE BVPS 0.06531 0.00054 0.11536 0.00099 0.06413 0.00045 
 EPS 0.06493 0.00052 0.11492 0.00078 0.06465 0.00043 
FE model with year FE BVPS 0.00031 0.00021 0.00081 0.00004 -0.00008 0.00006 
 EPS -0.00017 0.00019 0.00042 0.00026 0.00024 0.00004 
Notes: In this Table we report the results of 500 Monte Carlo simulations for the coefficient bias and standard error bias resulting from neglecting firm FE when they are correlated with explanatory variables of the 
PRM: BVPS and EPS. Panel A considers 10 fictitious periods (T = 10), Panel B five periods (T = 5), and Panel C considers maximum number of periods equal to 10, but we attrition bias leading to an average time span 
equal to 9 periods.  
In Columns denoted with (1), (3), and  (5) we report the coefficient bias, that is, the average difference between the coefficient value used to simulate the DGP (see equation below) and the estimated coefficient for 
each of the 500 simulations. In Columns (2), (4), and (6) we report average difference (in absolute value) between the estimated standard errors and the true standard errors, calculated following Petersen (2009). To 
ensure that the simulations are comparable to our sample in terms number of firms in each industry and country, we consider all the firms in our dataset that have a SIC number (2,842), but we replace the actual data on 
P, BVPS and EPS with simulated data. In particular, we employ the following Data Generating Processes (DGP): 
Pit = 0.730BVPSit + 4.306EPSit + ci + si + ηi + yt + uit      
Where ci stand for the country-level factors (time invariant), si are industry-level factors (time invariant), ηi are firm-level factors,
 16 yt are time-varying factors (the same for all fictitious firms), and uit is a standard 
normal variable with mean zero and variance one. BVPSit and EPSit are simulated as normal variables. To ensure that macroeconomic shocks at the country level are independent of industry-level shocks, and firm-specific 
shocks are independent of both country-level and industry-level shocks (formally, ci   si   ηi) we assign randomly each firm to a country and industry. We simulate these shocks so that the distribution of each shock 
is normal. For Panel C, we allow 20% of the firms to exit the sample from the sixth period onwards (50% of the sample period). This results in a loss of 20% * 50% = 10% of the observations, and an average sample 
period equal to 9 periods (that is, 10  – 0.1*10).   
                                                          
16 These could be interpreted as different types of macro- (that is, industry or country level) and micro-economic shocks. 
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Table 9: Tips for applied researchers. 
Econometric Issue Suggested approach 
How to choose among FE model, RE model, and OLS model 
Run the robust version of the Hausman test:  
1. If significant, use FE model; 
2. If insignificant, Breusch-Pagan LM test: 
a. If significant, use RE model; 
b. If insignificant, use OLS model. 
 
In cross-country studies, we suggest that the researchers compare the results for the whole sample with those 
for country-based sub-sample. For countries with a small number of firms, the results of the tests should be 
considered with caution. 
 
Note: In some cases, a researcher may decide that it is appropriate to include firm FE (regardless of the result 
of robust Hausman tests) because:  
1. There is little time-series variation in explanatory variables. For example, this may happen if the PRM 
or RRM models are augmented with corporate governance variables.  
2. The researcher believes that accounting data is uncorrelated with time-invariant unobserved factors. 
However, in this case, we suggest that the researcher clarifies the reasons for her assumption and 
briefly discusses the robust Hausman test results. 
How to deal with year FE, industry FE and country FE 
Industry FE and country FE cannot replace firm FE.  
 
Year FE are needed unless time-varying macroeconomic components that are the same for each firm are 
included (e.g., GDP for single-country study). 
 
Note: Depending on the research questions, robustness tests considering the impact of industry and country FE 
may also be useful. In certain cases, the researcher may want to examine time-invariant factors that are not 
necessarily unique to the individual.  
Clustering 
Clustering at the firm level is generally needed as standard errors are more conservative. 
 
When number of clusters is small, this can lead to biased standard errors – consider alternative level of 
clustering (for example, firm level, instead of country level). 
 
Robustness checks considering the impact of clustering the standard errors on different levels (including two-
level clustering) may be helpful. 
Attrition bias 
Allow for potential attrition bias, especially for FE models.  
Studies with a sample period that includes the financial crisis, which can lead to a sudden drop in the number 
of sample firms, should consider the impact of attrition on coefficient estimates as well as R-squared values. 
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Figure 1. Number of sample firms and total market capitalisation for the whole sample (in 
millions of Euros) during 2005-2013. 
a) 
 
b) 
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Appendix A. Sample composition. 
2-digit 
SIC 
Obs.ns 
2-digit 
SIC 
Obs.ns 
2-digit 
SIC 
Obs.ns 
2-digit 
SIC 
Obs.ns Country Obs.ns Firms SIC P BVPS EPS RET DEPS ΔDEPS 
            Mean 
01 17 28 472 48 275 72 63 AUSTRIA 117 37 12 68.684 52.424 5.061 0.169 0.105 0.002 
02 43 29 56 49 365 73 1.522 BELGIUM 626 107 28 64.629 49.745 4.809 0.046 0.095 -0.004 
07 0 30 145 50 529 75 29 DENMARK 224 71 19 70.271 82.024 8.274 0.193 0.098 0.004 
09 11 32 199 51 269 76 9 FINLAND 652 100 31 12.758 8.019 1.225 0.043 0.086 0.001 
10 41 33 133 52 23 78 58 FRANCE 3.010 513 50 96.221 78.071 6.377 0.094 0.125 -0.025 
12 16 34 130 53 18 79 91 GERMANY 2.821 509 49 62.343 77.647 7.920 0.109 0.118 0.001 
13 145 35 511 54 13 80 74 GREECE 821 169 42 5.555 4.908 0.518 0.078 0.098 -0.010 
14 54 36 391 55 4 81 0 IRELAND 137 28 17 10.734 4.118 0.608 0.158 0.099 0.006 
15 402 37 201 56 49 82 17 ITALY 935 178 43 9.070 7.520 0.705 0.059 0.088 -0.006 
16 61 38 176 57 22 83 12 LUXEMBOURG 53 18 7 28.956 44.245 4.944 0.114 0.326 0.023 
17 108 39 58 58 59 84 16 
NETHERLAND
S 596 104 28 
101.626 43.950 8.284 0.090 0.097 -0.001 
20 449 40 9 59 68 87 766 NORWAY 473 92 29 12.669 9.744 1.234 0.040 0.113 0.004 
21 18 41 49 60 128 91 5 PORTUGAL 213 40 10 5.318 4.166 0.541 0.057 0.108 -0.003 
22 73 42 33 61 765 94 2 SPAIN 640 124 29 20.164 16.471 3.405 0.031 0.195 0.001 
23 55 43 18 62 42 96 8 SWEDEN 1.261 232 29 11.670 6.806 1.211 0.120 0.102 -0.001 
24 36 44 206 64 64 97 9 SWITZERLAND 888 139 14 482.551 236.072 28.754 0.113 0.073 0.003 
25 58 45 81 65 655   U.K. 2.189 399 56 5.019 2.856 0.463 0.147 0.104 -0.004 
26 116 46 9 67 4.475 Total 15,610 Total 15.656 2.860 71 69.552 50.816 5.436 0.098 0.111 0.006 
27 365 47 72 70 89             
Notes: SIC is the two-digit Standard Industry Classification code. Mean is the sample average for each of the variables. 
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